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Vertical Restraints Among Hospitals,
Physicians and Health Insurers that
Raise Rivals' Costs
A Case Study of Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Kansas, Inc. and Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island
Jonathan B. Baker*
Two recent district court opinions consider whether affiliations among hos-
pitals, doctors and health insurers - through contract or ownership - vio-
late the antitrust laws. This Article applies a raising rivals' costs framework
to the facts of those cases in order to assess whether the practices at issue
were unreasonable.
When consumers buy health care, they purchase a complex prod-
uct combining insurance, the services of medical professionals and the
right to use specialized capital equipment typically found in hospitals.
In this way, health care is created jointly by health insurers, physicians
and hospitals. While the individual services sold by doctors, insurers
and hospitals can be more finely parsed, this Article treats each as ho-
mogeneous' in order to focus on the antitrust consequences of contrac-
tual restraints among their providers.
In the traditional organization of the health care industry, consum-
ers chose their provider of each component service independently. Pa-
tients selected separately their primary care physician, their health
insurer if any, and, in conjunction with their doctor, the hospital at
which care would be provided when hospitalization was necessary.
2
* Assistant Professor, The Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth
College. The author is indebted to William Blumenthal, Robert Lande, Monica Noether,
Steven Salop, and Joseph Simons.
I For example, the term "hospital services" includes the services of non-physician profes-
sionals (such as nurses, dieticians, technicians and physical therapists) and non-professional
staff (such as orderlies) provided in hospital settings, in addition to the use of specialized
medical equipment. Moreover, some physician specialties not involving direct care, such as
pathology or radiology, might be considered part of hospital rather than doctor services.
2 To the extent that patients delegate health care decisions to their doctor, the choice of a
hospital may be made by the physician rather than the patient.
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Moreover, the providers of each component service were generally not
tied contractually to the providers of other components. Insurers
awarded reimbursement regardless of the doctor or hospital providing
care. Doctors accepted patients regardless of the patient's insurer and
often provided care at multiple hospitals. Hospitals served the patients
of all insurers and many doctors.
The traditional organization of the health care industry is rapidly
changing.3  Doctors, insurers and hospitals increasingly affiliate,
whether by contract or merger, for the most part in order to lower the
cost of providing health care.4 Under such arrangements, providers
and insurers may agree not to provide health care or reimbursement in
combination with unaffiliated parties, or they may charge patients a
higher fee if a non-affiliated doctor or hospital is chosen. Health main-
tenance organizations (HMOs), for example, typically provide health
insurance on the condition that patients obtain care exclusively through
affiliated physicians and at affiliated hospitals, with exceptions for emer-
gency care.5 Preferred provider organizations (PPOs)6 encourage pa-
tients to select affiliated doctors or hospitals, although they also offer
partial coverage of care obtained from unaffiliated providers. Health
care is increasingly sold prospectively, through a contract by which a
patient commits simultaneously to an insurer, a set of physicians and a
set of hospitals for the life of the agreement, typically one year. In con-
trast, traditional fee for service insurance contracts reimburse patients
for their actual health care expenditures.
This change in industry structure is occurring against the back-
ground of a health insurance industry dominated in many sections of
the country by two nonprofit providers frequently merged today: 7 Blue
Cross (for hospital services) and Blue Shield (for physician charges)
collectively termed "BC/BS". 8 In many states these health insurance
3 See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
4 Doctors and hospitals, however, generally accept affiliations with multiple insurers.
5 HMOs and PPOs may be set up in a variety of organizational forms that differ in the
extent to which affiliated doctors and hospitals share risks and profits. See generally Havig-
hurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1070, 1073 n.3 (1984)(HMO organization); Gasparovich, Preferred Provider Organizations and
Provider Contracting. New Analyses Under the Sherman Act, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 377, 379-80
(1985)(PPO organization).
6 "A Preferred Provider Organization sells the health care services of independent prov-
iders to third party payors at a discounted rate in exchange for expedited payment and prefer-
ential access to insured consumers. Insured consumers are free to use providers who are not
part of the PPO, but usually face increased cost-sharing if they do so. PPOs may be organized
by independent entrepreneurs or by hospitals." B. FURROW, S. JOHNSON, T. JOST & R.
SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 476 (1987).
7 The state Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans named as defendants in the two cases dis-
cussed below had merged by the time of the litigation.
8 Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurance plans often are controlled by a group of doctors
or hospitals. Although the market for health insurance has grown larger and more competi-
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plans provide the majority of private insurance coverage. Courts en-
forcing the antitrust laws carefully scrutinize their competitive initia-
tives because of BC/BS' high market shares.
9
In recent years, the reorganization of the health care industry has
spawned a number of antitrust suits challenging the creation of vertical
restraints' ° among hospitals, doctors and insurers."' This Article con-
siders in detail two recent decisions involving the creation of affiliations
among formerly independent health care providers: Reazin v. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc. 12 and Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc.
tive in recent decades, the Blues have preserved large market shares in many localities, per-
haps as a result of a reputational advantage associated with early entry. In many states these
insurers are organized as non-profit firms in order to secure tax advantages. See grerally
Pauly, Competition in Health Insurance Markets, - L. & CoNTxMp. PROBs. - (I Gs9)(in press).
9 The Ocean State court argues incorrectly that antitrust law evaluates vertical business
practices without regard to the market share of the firms involved. See Ocean State Physicians
Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 692 F. Supp. 52, 71 (D. R.I. 1988). In
fact, most vertical restraints are tested under the rule of reason, which requires an analysis of
market power. None are tested under a standard of per se legality. See generally ABA ATI-
TRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST L.Aw DEVELOPMENTS 55-108 (2d ed. 1984). Thus, antitrust law
requires closer scrutiny of vertical practices implemented by a dominant firm, like BC/BS,
than those created by firms with small market share. See Miller, Vertical Restraints and Powerful
Health Insurers: Exclusionary Conduct Masquerading as Managed Care? - L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
(1989)(in press)(evaluating legal consequences of BC/BS monopsony).
10 In antitrust usage, vertical arrangements are agreements between firms and their cus-
tomers, distributors or suppliers. Thus, vertically related firms sell complementary products.
This contrasts with horizontal arrangements between rivals that sell substitute products.
These traditional antitrust distinctions are being undermined by the raising rivals' costs analy-
sis applied in this Article, which focuses on the horizontal effects of vertical practices. Krat-
tenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96
YALE L.J. 209, 215 (1986).
Contracts among hospitals, doctors, and health insurers are classified in this article as
-vertical because patients treat the services of each as (demand) complements in providing
health care. Similarly, a contract between an automobile manufacturer and a steel manufac-
turer is a vertical arrangement because car buyers view the contributions of the steel producer
and the firm which transforms that steel into an automobile as complements in providing
transportation services. The role of supply, demand, and transactions complements in anti-
trust law is discussed in detail in Baker, Antitrust Analysis of Hospital Mergers and the Transforma-
tion of the Hospital Industry, - L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. - (1989)(in press).
11 See, e.g., Ball Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir.
1986)(BC/BS introduction of PPO upheld); Barry v. Blue Cross Calif., 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.
1986)(Blue Cross introduction of PPO upheld); Brillhart v. Mutual Med. Ins. Inc., 768 F.2d
196 (7th Cir. 1985)(BC/BS introduction of PPO upheld); Kartell v. Blue Shield Mass., Inc.,
749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984)(upholding insurer's contractual requirement that participating
physicians accept insurer reimbursement as payment in full), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
The reorganization of the health care industry also has led to two other types of antitrust
cases not discussed in this article: lawsuits challenging the denial to doctors of hospital staff
privileges, and litigation challenging the propriety of horizontal agreements among physi-
cians forming a PPO. See, e.g., Enders, Federal Antitrust Issues Involved in the Denial of Medical Staff
Privileges, 17 LOYOLA U. CHIi. L.J. 331 (1986); Greaney & Sindelar, Physician-Sponsored Joint Ven-
tures: An Antitrust Analysis of Preferred Provider Organizations, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 551-59 (1987);
Gasparovich, supra note 5, at 377.
.12 663 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Kan. 1987). An earlier opinion in this litigation, Reazin v. Blue
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v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island.'3 Both cases resulted from the
reorganization of health care provision among insurers, hospitals and
doctors. In each, BC/BS, the dominant insurer, was accused of anti-
trust violations resulting from its aggressive response to a new HMO.
Each rival HMO involved a vertical affiliation between a competing in-
surer and some doctors (and in Reazin, a further affiliation with one of
four area hospitals). BC/BS responded to new competition in both
cases by creating or modifying its own vertical arrangements with hos-
pitals or physicians. These BC/BS actions were challenged under the
antitrust laws. In both cases, juries found against BC/BS, although the
large insurer was awarded a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in
Ocean State.
Because the modem reorganization of the health care industry is
primarily motivated by insurer and provider desires to cut costs, new
vertical arrangements in the industry will most likely be procompetitive.
As a consequence, such restraints generally will be permitted under the
antitrust laws. 4 Vertical restraints can nevertheless be anticompetitive,
as when they confer market power by "raising rivals' costs,"'
3
This Article argues that an economic logic of "raising rivals' costs"
may underlie the jury verdicts in Reazin and Ocean State. The discussion
below describes how vertical restraints among hospitals, doctors and
health insurers may create market power by raising costs for existing
and potential competitors, without also creating offsetting efficiencies.
If these new arrangements raise the costs of disfavored hospital-in-
surer-doctor combinations, they may give favored affiliated networks of
Cross & Blue Shield of Kans., Inc., 635 F/. Supp. 1287 (D. Kan. 1986), will hereinafter be referred
to as Reazin I.
13 692 F. Supp. 52 (D. R.I. 1988).
14 Before the mid- 1970s, courts reviewing antitrust cases were hostile to vertical re-
straints and mergers. Since that time, the antitrust regulation of vertical practices has
changed dramatically. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977),
overruling U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Moreover, after GTE Sylvania,
courts and governmental enforcers generally have upheld non-price vertical restraints against
antitrust challenge. See generally J. KwoKA, JR. & L. WHiTE, THE ANTrIRUST REVOLUTION 264-
72 (1989). Today the mainstream view accepts a relaxed scrutiny of vertical restraints,
presuming that such arrangements were created to lower production distribution costs or
otherwise improve the efficiency of resource allocation. See infro note 37; but cf Fox & Sulli-
van, Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are l'e Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 956 (1987)(The Supreme Court "has never incorporated the claim of the
radical right that antitrust law should reprehend only that which is allocatively inefficient, or
their insistence that private business transactions are efficient.").
15 Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop, Monopoly Power and larket Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO.
LJ. 241 (1987); Salop & Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36J. INDUs. ECON. 19 (1987); Krat-
tenmaker & Salop, supra note 10, at 243. Vertical restraints also can confer market power
through mechanisms not involving raising rivals' costs, for example by facilitating horizontal
coordination among dealers or by facilitating manufacturer collusion through raising entry
barriers.
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insurers and providers the power to raise the price of health care over
competitive levels (or keep prices from declining). 6 The resulting
harm to competition would, be comparable to the harm generated by
horizontal price-fixing among the affiliate groupings.
17
Section I of this Article shows how the Reazin and Ocean State litiga-
tion emerged from the reorganization of the health care industry. Sec-
tion II argues that the vertical practices at issue in these cases were
probably not intended to reduce production costs or to achieve any
other economic efficiency. Section III constructs raising rivals' costs
explanations to show how the challenged vertical arrangements could
permit firms to obtain market power. As will be seen, it is difficult to be
confident that all the factual predicates are met for these raising rivals'
costs interpretation because the courts did not frame their opinions in
such terms. With this evidentiary difficulty in mind, the concluding sec-
tion evaluates the varying judgments entered by the two courts follow-
ing jury verdicts of liability.
I. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the modem trend in the institutional or-
ganization of health care provision. In the past, depicted in Figure 1, 8
patients would choose among a smorgasbord of options for obtaining
health care. 9 Patients would select a doctor from the many physicians
16 The power to raise prices encompasses the power to keep prices from declining when
the competitive price falls, as may occur when seller's marginal costs decline. Krattenmaker,
Lande & Salop, supra note 15, at 258.
17 Horizontal price fixing and a raising rivals' costs practice both create market power by
reducing aggregate industry output below what a competitive industry would produce and
raising industry prices above competitive levels. If, however, a practice that raises rivals' costs
produces a reduction in an industry's output equal to that created by collusion among the
excluding firm and its rivals, the social loss from raising rivals' costs most likely would be
larger than from interfirm cooperation. Both anticompetitive schemes require that firms ex-
pend resources on ensuring that the market price rises: it is costly for an excluding firm to bar
its rivals from low-cost inputs or to create some other instrument of non-price predation, and
it is costly for a cartel to coordinate and police its agreement. But if an excluding firm suc-
cessfully raises rivals' costs, a production inefficiency is created insofar as more resources are
employed in production by the disfavored rivals than would be employed under a collusive
agreement. See Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop, supra note 15, at 247-48 (comparing the market
power exercised by restraining one's own output with the market power exercised by re-
straining rivals' output).
18 In this diagram, MD, and MD., each could be thought of as single doctors or as a group
medical practice. Differences among medical specialties are ignored; it is assumed that MD,
and MD., provide the same services. Similarly, the hospitals, HSPI and HSP.,, could each rep-
resent a set of affiliated hospitals (under common ownership or management). Moreover,
figure 1 - suitably generalized with additional hospitals, doctors, and insurers - is presumed
to include all providers within the geographic market in which health care competition occurs.
19 This stylized model is intended to emphasize the changes in industry structure re-
flected in Reazin and Ocean State. It is not intended to encompass all variations in the organiza-
tion of health care provision characteristic of the past or present. Other commentators have
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in an area (represented as MD, and MD 2). Each physician could be affil-
iated with multiple hospitals (HSPI and HSP2), permitting patients
some choice among hospitals. Moreover, patients obtaining medical
care from any combination of doctor and hospital could obtain reim-
bursement by contracting with any provider of health insurance (INS,
or INS2 ). In most locations, however, BC/BS traditionally served most
of the private health insurance market.2 °
Health care provision is moving away from the model of Figure 1
and toward the model represented in Figure 2. The insurer, often tak-
ing the form of an HMO or PPO, may now contract with a subset of
area doctors and hospitals to provide medical services for subscribers.
Patients obtaining reimbursement from a particular insurer are increas-
ingly limited to selecting from among the doctors and hospitals affili-
ated with that insurance plan. Providers, however, often acquire
affiliations with several insurers. Health care provision is becoming or-
ganized such that integrated or affiliated combinations of hospitals,
doctors and insurers compete with other integrated or affiliated combi-
nations for patients. While this transformation is not yet complete, it is
well underway in many areas of the country.
The transformation of the health care industry is largely a response
to cost cutting pressures. In the traditional model of Figure 1, insurers
reimbursed patient health care expenditures in full, retrospectively.
Under such a reimbursement rule, patients and their doctors had no
incentive to economize on care or cost. Health care providers were ex-
tremely cautious - and expensive - in their approach to medicine.
For example, costly tests were routinely employed to rule out remote
diagnoses and hospitals delayed patient discharge.
In the past fifteen years, the health insurance industry has moved
away from unscrutinized, retrospective reimbursement in several ways.
Government insurers (Medicare and Medicaid) and fee-for-service pri-
vate insurers (such as many BC/BS plans) increasingly reimburse prov-
iders with a fixed payment based on patient diagnosis. Health care
providers now have a greater incentive to economize on treatment; they
profit when the care they provide costs less than the reimbursement
they receive.21 Similarly, PPOs and HMOs - the institutional arrange-
described the transformation of the health care industry similarly. See, e.g., Havighurst, supra
note 5, at 1071-75 (new forms of industry organization); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1371 (D. Kan. 1987) ("Perhaps more so than any federal
antitrust litigation to date, this case results from the unprecedented economic pressures and
turmoil within the health care services and financing industries from the beginning of this
decade.").
20 Patients who do not seek private insurance can self-insure, rely on governmental pro-
grams (Medicare and Medicaid), or can receive benefits from employers who self-insure.
21 Further, with the expansion of deductibles and co-payment provisions in health insur-
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ments most commonly generating the reorganization depicted in Fig-
ure 2 - often accomplish the substitution of prospective
reimbursement for retrospective reimbursement.22 Doctors and hospi-
tals contract to provide care for all patients of the HMO during a year
'in exchange for a fixed fee per patient (capitation). The health care
providers then earn profits by cutting costs.
This ongoing reorganization of the health care industry led to the
litigation in Reazin and Ocean State, challenging vertical restraints be-
tween insurers and doctors or hospitals. Both cases were prompted by
a BC/BS plan's competitive response to the establishment of a compet-
ing HMO. Rival HMOs threaten BC/BS to the extent they are success-
ful in cutting the costs of health care for their subscribers; under such
circumstances the HMO could charge less for insurance than BC/BS.
Reazin involved a suit brought by Wesley, 23 the largest of four hos-
pitals in Wichita,2 4 and by Health Care Plus, a small but successful
Wichita HMO, 25 against the state's BC/BS.insurer.2 ' BC/BS provided
60% of the health insurance in an area comprising most of Kansas:
ance contracts, patients have increased incentive to economize and to instruct their providers
to control costs.
22 In addition, these arrangements help lower the costs of care by allowing better insurer
monitoring of provider care decisions. See infra note 45.
23 Dr. Walter Reazin was the Chairman of the Wesley Board of Trustees. Wesley was a
large, successful tertiary care teaching hospital associated with the University of Kansas
School of Medicine. Reazin, 663 F. Supp. at 1371, 1373.
24 In 1984, Wesley accounted for 43% of city inpatient admissions and 35% of the city's
2,264 hospital beds. The two rival hospitals that were alleged to have conspired with BC/BS
served 305 and 22% of total admissions, and controlled 34% and 25% of the city's hospital
beds. A fourth hospital obtained 5% of total admissions and accounted for 6% of city hospi-
tal beds. Reazin 1, 635 F. Supp. 1287, 1297 (D. Kan. 1986).
25 The district court found that Health Care Plus (HCP) is an
"individual practice association," or "gatekeeper," model HMO in which members
must select a primary care physician from those under contract with HCP. A mem-
ber's monthly premiums pay for all needed medical care so long as it is obtained
from the chosen primary care physician, or a specialist or hospital authorized by that
physician as needed. [citations omitted). Each physician contracting with HCP is
paid a capitation fee, a specified amount for each member choosing that physician as
his or her primary care provider. HCP does not separately contract with specialists;
rather, each primary care physician determines in his own discretion whether to refer
to an HCP patient elsewhere for needed medical attention, upon which HCP pays the
specialist's fees. HCP sets aside a portion of the capitation fund .... and a hospital
fund, to cover specialist and hospital costs for services rendered HCP patients.
Funds not used at the end of a year are returned to the contracting physicians, each
of whom receives a pro rata share of the refund based on the number of HCP pa-
tients treated.
Although not contracting with specialists, HCP does contract with hospitals.
HCP has capitation agreements with Wesley and [another Wichita hospital]. Under
these contracts the hospitals are paid a certain monthly figure per member. These
amounts are paid whether or not the members receive care at the hospitals, but if the
members do seek services there the hospitals must provide care and are paid no
more than the monthly capitation. HCP has fee-for-service contracts with [two other
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Health Care Plus served 8-12% of insurance business in the county sur-
rounding Wichita.2 7 Plaintiffs complained because BC/BS terminated
a contract under which it would pay Wesley for hospital care provided
to BC/BS subscribers.28 BC/BS apparently intended to reimburse its
subscribers directly for the cost of care obtained at Wesley, although at
Wichita hospitals], under which those hospitals are not paid capitation but are simply
reimbursed for any services which may be provided HCP members.
Reazin, 663 F. Supp. at 1374-75 (citations omitted).
26 BC/BS was the largest nonfederal source of revenues to hospitals in its service area. It
accounted for 16% of a large Wichita hospital's (not Wesley) revenues, while no other com-
petitor accounted for as much as 5%. Id. at 1416-17.
27 Id. at 1398-99 (market definition), 1416 (BC/BS' share), 1465 (finding no. 21)(Health
Care Plus' share). Measured by premiums dollars, BC/BS had 62% of the private health care
financing business in Kansas, while its next largest competitors, Bankers Life and Aetna, had
4% and 3% of the market respectively. Id. at 1464 (finding no. 16).
28 In early 1984, responding to pressure from patients, legislators, and state regulators to
reduce the rapid rate of increase in patient premiums and hospital utilization, BC/BS re-
placed cost-plus reimbursement of hospitals with a program that established a reimbursement
maximum based upon a patient's entering diagnosis. The contracts between BC/BS and hos-
pitals to implement this program also included a "most favored nations" clause, under which
participating hospitals agreed that BC/BS reimbursements never would exceed the reim-
bursements the hospital accepted from competing insurers for the same patient diagnosis. Id.
at 1375.
Also in 1984, BC/BS responded to cost-cutting pressures and the presence of a compet-
ing HMO by setting up an HMO of its own. The BC/BS HMO was far less successful than
Health Care Plus. Health Care Plus' early presence in Wichita provided it with an advantage
over the BC/BS HMO plan in attracting patients. Furthermore, Health Care Plus' higher
capitation rates provided an advantage in attracting physicians. Id. at 1376; cf. infra note 72
(subscriber switching costs). In consequence, the BC/BS HMO abandoned the Wichita mar-
ket, although it continued to operate elsewhere in Kansas. Id. at 1377.
In 1985, BC/BS attempted to introduce a preferred provider organization into Wichita
and to reintroduce an HMO. The BC/BS PPO had difficulty developing a reimbursement
system satisfactory simultaneously to physicians and hospitals. While Wesley participated ac-
tively in negotiating terms for the BC/BS PPO, a BC/BS executive allegedly attributed Wes-
ley's desire to participate to HCA's intention to force a rival Wichita hospital out of business.
Id. at 1378-79. BC/BS and two Wichita hospitals other than Wesley developed a new HMO
plan. Those negotiations also involved the possibility that the rival hospitals would give
BC/BS discounts on the level of diagnosis-based reimbursements they would accept, contin-
gent on BC/BS termination of Wesley. Id. at 1380-82. BC/BS' contract with Wesley permit-
ted termination on 120 days notice. Id. at 1389.
On August 1, 1985, the Wall StreetJournal reported that HCA intended to introduce group
health insurance and a PPO plan in approximately twenty cities over the next eighteen
months, as part of a corporate effort to become a fully-integrated health care company. Id. at
1380. Later that month, the BC/BS executive committee voted to terminate its diagnosis-
based reimbursement contract with Wesley, effective January 1, 1986. BC/BS would continue
to reimburse its subscribers for care at Wesley, but at levels no higher than reimbursements
given rival hospitals for the same services. BC/BS would no longer directly pay Wesley any
subscriber reimbursement. Id. at 1383-85.
By early November, BC/BS had negotiated discount reimbursement contracts with the
two rival hospitals. In November, Wesley and its affiliate Health Care Plus filed suit against
BC/BS and the two competing Wichita hospitals charging that the termination of Wesley was
illegal. Id. at 1387-88. BC/BS counterclaimed, alleging in part that HCA's acquisitions of
Wesley and Health Care Plus were undertaken in order to eliminate competition from BC/BS
and competing Wichita hospitals. Id. at 1390.
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a rate not to exceed those charged by rival hospitals contracting with
BC/BS.29
BC/BS terminated Wesley's contract shortly after Health Care Plus
had been acquired by Hospital Corporation of American (HCA), the
large national hospital chain that had previously acquired Wesley.30
The HCA acquisitions and BC/BS' termination of the contract with
Wesley created two affiliated groupings of health care providers. The
first grouping consisted of the HCA insurer (Health Care Plus), the
HCA hospital (Wesley), and affiliated physicians. 3 The second group-
ing, an inchoate affiliation, 32 was comprised of BC/BS and the city's
remaining doctors and hospitals.
A jury found that BC/BS acted improperly in terminating Wesley.
BC/BS was held liable for monopolization under Sherman Act Section
2, for a conspiracy in restraint of trade in conjunction with other city
hospitals in violation of Sherman Act Section 1, and for tortious inter-
ference with Wesley's business relations under state law. Plaintiffs were
awarded nearly $8 million in damages and costs.
3 3
The plaintiff in Ocean State, a three year old HMO, charged the
9 Id. at 1386 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., press release (Aug. 29,
1985)). The court does not explain how contract termination would have injured either Wes-
ley or consumers when, had it been effected, BC/BS subscribers would have continued to
receive some reimbursement for care obtained at Wesley. The court appears to presume that
Wesley would have lost customers to rival hospitals, perhaps because patients would find it
relatively more expensive to use Wesley once they were required to handle the administrative
costs of reimbursement rather than having their insurer deal directly with the hospital, see
Reazin 1, 635 F. Supp. 1287, 1295-96 (D. Kan. 1986), or perhaps because patients would not
have been fully reimbursed for expenses incurred at high cost tertiary care teaching hospitals
if BC/BS rates were determined by charges at competitive hospitals. See Reazin, 663 F. Supp.
at 1425-27 (upholding award of damages to Wesley). Moreover, contract termination may
have increased the proportion of patients failing to pay Wesley.
30 Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) acquired Wesley as part of a national strategy
of acquiring tertiary care "centers of excellence" throughout the country in order to meet
patient preferences for quality health care. Reazin, 663 F. Supp. at 1377. HCA acquired
Health Care Plus as a way of developing the internal management experience necessary to
create and market HMOs elsewhere in the country. Id. at 1378. Both affiliates had substantial
management autonomy, and their interaction with HCA largely was financial. Id. at 1378.
After the events which led to litigation, HCA decided to withdraw from the health care financ-
ir.!' business, and reduced its affiliation with Health Care Plus to that of a passive investor. Id.
at 1475 (finding no. 88).
s1 Although other area hospitals had contracted with Health Care Plus, they also had
negotiated with BC/BS concerning BC/BS' termination of Wesley. Id. at 1374-75, 1382,
1474 (finding no. 77).
32 See supra note 28.
33 The jury found that the contract termination injured Wesley by causing it to lose some
business from BC/BS subscribers, and determined that Wesley suffered more than $1.5 mil-
lion in damages. Reazin, 663 F. Supp. at 1425-27. These damages were trebled and punitive
damages of $750,000 were awarded on the state law tortious interference claim. Id. at 1427-
30. Defendants also were required to pay more than $2.4 million in costs and attorneys fees.
Id. at 1449-59. The large damage award to Wesley was upheld even though the date of con-
tract termination had yet to occur when the complaint was filed, and even though the parties
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Rhode Island BC/BS plan with monopolization of the state health care
insurance market. BC/BS controlled a large portion of the Rhode Is-
land market, with a share alternately measured at 57% and 80%, while
plaintiff Ocean State, the HMO, controlled roughly 10%.. The dis-
trict court entered a judgment in favor of BC/BS, notwithstanding a
jury verdict in favor of Ocean State.
The Ocean State court held that BC/BS did not exercise its market
power unlawfully when it insisted upon a most favored nations clause in
its contracts with physicians,3" despite the harm created by that provi-
sion for the competing HMO, which had contracted to share its finan-
cial risk with affiliated doctors. 6 The court found that BC/BS was
entitled to become the low cost producer of insurance by bargaining
for low physician fees. The "inevitable" harm to Ocean State resulting
from this use of BC/BS bargaining power was a natural consequence of
competition, not the result of an antitrust violation.
3 7
agreed to maintain the status quo (by staying termination of BC/BS' contract with Wesley)
pending the outcome of the litigation.
34 Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 692 F.
Supp. 52, 57-58 (D. R.I. 1988).
35 The most favored nations clause was termed the "prudent buyer policy." It required
physicians accepting a low reimbursement from a provider, such as Ocean State, to charge no
higher rate to BC/BS if they decided to accept BC/BS' reimbursement. Id. at 60.
Ocean State also complained about two other BC/BS programs: the new HealthMate
product, and "adverse selection rating factors." BC/BS marketed HealthMate as an alterna-
tive to the Ocean State HMO. HealthMate was offered only when BC/BS was competing with
Ocean State for business, as when an employer allowed employees to select among health
care alternatives (A state law mandated that employers offer an HMO to their employees as a
health insurance option if an HMO provided services in the area where an employee resided.
Id. at 57). HealthMate offered greater coverage than the standard BC/BS product, but limited
subscribers to participating physicians. All BC/BS participating physicians were required to
accept the HealthMate payment as payment in full. HealthMate was marketed with a financial
incentive to employers. Id. at 58.
BC/BS introduced "adverse selection rating factors" whenever it feared it would lose
healthier subscribers to an HMO. BC/BS charged employers the lowest rate on its standard
policy when employers offered only standard BC/BS coverage. It charged a higher rate when
employers offered standard BC/BS, HealthMate, and a competing HMO such as Ocean State.
It charged the highest rate to employers offering standard BC/BS and competing HMO, but
not offering HealthMate. Id. at 59.
36 From its inception in 1983, Ocean State withheld 20% of its physician fees until the
end of the year, paying them to doctors only if the HMOs revenues exceeded costs. From
BC/BS' perspective, Ocean State was obtaining medical setvices at a discount of up to 20%
when compared to the fees BC/BS was required to pay. Only in 1984 did the HMO return
the withheld funds to affiliated doctors. The competitive responses of BC/BS that prompted
the Ocean State litigation occurred in 1986. Id. at 60.
37 Id. at 71. The court further held that it was entitled to conclude that the jury found no
antitrust violation, despite the jury's express finding of a violation of Sherman Act Section 2,
because the jury awarded no damages on the antitrust claim and, in consequence, must have
found no harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 66. In reaching the conclusion that plaintiff suffered no
loss, the court ignored the $2.5 million compensatory damages (and $500,000 punitive dam-
ages) found by the jury on Ocean State's tort claim against BC/BS for intentional interference
with contractual relationships, apparently on the bootstrap theory that this loss did not arise
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These two case studies show that conduct associated with the
transformation of the health care industry can easily raise antitrust
questions. Patients no longer contract independently with hospitals,
doctors and insurers; and insurers impose new requirements on physi-
cians and hospitals who accept their subscribers. If a careful economic
analysis is not undertaken, the restraints associated with this reorgani-
zation could readily be characterized as unlawful under the antitrust
statutes. A number of legal categories could be invoked, including ty-
ing arrangements, exclusive dealing, requirements contracts, group
boycotts, customer restraints or monopolization. The litigated cases
focus on challenges to the competitive responses of BC/BS to industry
change,"8 undoubtedly because the insurer's large market share often
makes a monopolization claim plausible. In principle, however, all in-
surer contracts with hospitals and doctors, including those of HMOs
and PPOs, also bear antitrust risk. 9
The remainder of this Article investigates circumstances under
which reorganizations in the health care industry and their associated
vertical restraints should be considered to violate the antitrust laws.
The next two sections identify some efficiency benefits of this reorgani-
zation and its ancillary vertical restraints, and some ways in which pred-
atory firms can employ such restraints anticompetitively to create
market power by raising rivals' costs.
II. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS THAT LOWER HEALTH
CARE COSTS
In the past decade, antitrust law has come to recognize that vertical
integration and vertical restraints often create both private gains and
production efficiencies by reducing seller marginal cost.4" If the health
care industry is no exception to this general rule, vertical practices as-
sociated with its ongoing reorganization from the model of Figure 1 to
from an antitrust violation. The court also granted defendant's motion for a new trial on
plaintiff's state tort law claim, holding that the jury's verdict against BC/BS contradicted the
clear weight of the evidence that BC/BS' actions were justified responses to competitive con-
ditions. Id. at 73.
38 But cf. Ball Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir.
1986)(hospitals challenged BC/BS' introduction of a PPO).
s9 Cf Barry v. Blue Cross Calif., 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986)(physicians challenged Blue
Cross' introduction of a preferred provider plan in a state where the Blue Cross market share
was 16%). The smaller the market share of the firms imposing the vertical restraint, the less
likely the practice would create market power, even if it were predatory.
40 See, e.g., Preston, Territorial Restraints: GTE Sylvania, inJ. KwoA, Ja. & L. WHIrE, supra
note 13, at 273-89; see generaly Fisher, Johnson, & Lande, Do the DOJ Vertical Restraints Guidelines
Provide Guidance? 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 609, 615-16 (1987); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
288-309, 330-81 (1978)(influential commentary advocating relaxed scrutiny of vertical prac-
tices); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 171-211 (1976) (influential commentary advocating relaxed
scrutiny of vertical practices).
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the model of Figure 2 will lower the costs of providing health care.
When non-price vertical restraints have as their dominant motive and
effect the lowering of production costs, they do not violate the antitrust
laws.4'
The industry's reorganization lowers the costs of health care provi-
sion primarily by replacing retrospective reimbursement of doctors and
hospitals with prospective reimbursement, as through capitation fees or
diagnosis-related reimbursements,4" by introducing deductibles and
co-payments into patient contracts with insurers, and by increasing in-
surer monitoring of provider care decisions. 4' These mechanisms re-
duce costs by solving two incentive problems associated with the
traditional model of health care provision: the incentive for care prov-
iders to over-provide medical care and the incentive for patients to seek
excess care.44 The restrictions on doctors and hospitals associated with
the health care industry's reorganization typically support the introduc-
tion of these cost reduction mechanisms. 45 An HMO or PPO can best
control costs if its subscribers do not ,obtain a significant fraction of
their medical care from doctors or hospitals who are not subject to the
reimbursement limitations and utilization review that affiliated provid-
ers contract to accept. 46 Accordingly, these new forms of business or-
41 Non-price vertical restraints are unlawful only if they are unreasonable, with the excep-
tion of some forms of tying which are illegal per se. Both the tying exception and the per se
prohibition against resale price maintenance are narrowly construed. Business Elec. Corp. v.
Sharp Elec. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1520-22 (1988)(announcing presumption in favor of a
rule-of-reason standard); see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32
(1984)(O'Connor, J., concurring)(Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices Powell and
Rehnquist joined in the concurring opinion by Associate Justice O'Connor which advocated
abolishing application of per se doctrine to tying arrangements).
42 One commentator terms Medicare's shift during the mid-1980s from retrospective cost
.reimbursement to prospectively determined rates as "the most important change in federal
'health policy since the adoption of the Medicare and Medicaid programs." Havighurst, supra
note 5, at 1077 n.14.
43 See generally Joskow, Alternative Regulatory Mechanisms for Controlling Hospital Costs, in A
NEw APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE (M. Olson, ed., 1981); NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE: WHAT Now, WHAT LATER, WHAT NEVER? (M. Pauly, ed. 1980). Moreover, under a
cost-based reimbursement scheme, physicians have a diminished incentive to control their
charges to insurers if the "cost" of care is determined by reference to their own customary
rates rather than regional averages.
44 Typical utilization controls include requiring second opinions before costly procedures
are undertaken, restricting hospital lengths of stay, and reviewing care decisions before reim-
bursing providers.
45 However, prospective reimbursement, subscriber copayments, and insurer utilization
review have also been introduced by traditional fee-for-service health insurers.
46 If patients obtain care from unaffiliated providers, the HMO or PPO can limit its ex-
penditures by refusing to reimburse subscribers completely for the charges made by those
unaffiliated doctors and hospitals. Unaffiliated providers, however, are not subject to the util-
ization controls imposed by insurers to reduce physician and hospital incentives to provide
more care than necessary. Moreover, it is conceivable that an association of doctors, hospi-
tals, and insurers can conserve more resources than the traditional organization of health care
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ganization may prohibit patients from seeking care elsewhere (HMOs),
or may impose extra charges on patients who do so (PPOs).
Although vertical restraints have been imposed with the dominant
motive and effect of creating production efficiencies in the provision of
health care, the vertical restrictions challenged in Reazin were most
likely not of this social cost-saving type. BC/BS defended its termina-
tion of Wesley as a permissible competitive response to HCA's acquisi-
tion of both Wesley and Health Care Plus, not as a way to control the
fees it must pay providers for care given to subscribers. 7 BC/BS did
not claim that its action reduced the costs of providing medical care, or
that the termination improved social resource allocation by requiring
that patients choosing Wesley pay for the higher costs associated with
what was presumably the higher quality care offered at a tertiary care
teaching hospital. 8 Further, BC/BS did not suggest that it sought to
induce Wesley to control costs by imposing a higher co-payment on
patient charges at that hospital;49 had this been the insurer's goal it
would have continued to administer the reimbursement of those hospi-
tal charges, inasmuch as the contractual relationship would permit
provision through achieving scale economies or through better forecasting of patient de-
mand. In addition, such an association may be better able than unintegrated providers to cut
costs by tailoring its operation to avoid shortages or excess capacity.
47 In a memorandum to all Kansas hospitals defending its termination of Wesley, BC/BS'
President wrote:
With'the size and resources of HCA ... we could only come to the conclusion
that our role with the Wesley Medical Center has drastically changed. We no longer
fit into their long range plans. Thus, [we arrived at] our decision to cease con-
tracting with HCA and ... Wesley ....
We cannot stand idly by and watch insurance-hospital corporations, such as
HCA, monopolize the delivery and financing of care by seeking to enroll Blue Cross
and Blue Shield subscribers in their insurance program .... [11f hospitals decide to
compete with Blue Cross and Blue Shield in the manner that HCA is competing,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield must make a business decision about its future relation-
ship with those entities. Hospitals that ... do not seek to enroll subscribers in other
programs ... will experience no change in the contractual relationship that has his-
torically served Kansans well.
Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1387-88 (D. Kan. 1987).
In court, BC/BS offered a similar defense. Id. at 1392.
48 The author is grateful to Joseph Simons for this observation.
49 If insurer reimbursement is partial, the transactions costs involved in paying for hospi-
tal services may be increased if hospitals bill patients, and patients then seek reimbursement
on their own from insurers; rather than if hospitals bill both patients and insurers, and insur-
ers pay hospitals directly. Cf. Reazin 1, 635 F. Supp. 1287, 1295 (D. Kan. 1986)(a non-con-
tracting hospital must submit its claims on paper rather than using the less costly tape-to-tape
billing program). To the extent patients bear the transactions costs increase, such increase
operates as a higher co-payment to raise the patients' incentive to economize on utilization.
In the instant case, Wesley announced that other than existing deductibles and co-payments,
BC/BS subscribers would not be required to pay any excess charges. Reazin, 663 F. Supp. at
1380. Under su6zh circumstances, there could be no transaction costs reduction from altering
the existing system in which BC/BS handles the administrative tasks of reimbursement on
behalf of its subscribers.
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BC/BS to continue its utilization review.50 In addition BC/BS did not
argue that it terminated its contract with Wesley in order to induce care
providers to accept prospective reimbursement or greater utilization
review, and so generate incentives for hospitals to control costs. In the
absence of such arguments, the court readily found that the termina-
tion was not intended to achieve an efficiency, "but to sanction a per-
ceived competitor and deter competition in the health care financing
market."'
In contrast, the district court in Ocean State believed that the most
favored nations clause challenged in that litigation was designed exclu-
sively to produce cost savings for BC/BS. The court concluded that the
contract provision lowered the physician fees charged to BC/BS' sub-
scribers by ensuring that BC/BS' physician reimbursements were as
low as the payments made by any other insurer, 2 particularly the
Ocean State HMO."s But if BC/BS set out to bargain down the charges
of its affiliated doctors, 4 it is curious that it limited its attention to
those doctors who were affiliated with both plans.55 As reported by the
district court, moreover, the trial record appears to contain no evidence
that the BC/BS new contract provision was introduced in conjunction
with other reforms such as prospective reimbursement designed to re-
duce doctor incentives to over-provide care and overcharge patients.
5 6
Rather, the Ocean State record suggests that BC/BS intended this
contract provision to raise a physician's costs of affiliating with multiple
insurers. A BC/BS management employee observed that "not one guy
in the state isn't going to know the implication of signing with Ocean
50 See Reazin 1, 635 F. Supp. at 1295-96 (BC/BS cost containment programs are imple-
mented through insurer contracts with hospitals).
51 Reazin, 663 F. Supp. at 1411.
52 Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 692 F.
Supp. at 52, 60, 71 (D. R.I. 1988).
53 At the time of the litigation, Ocean State had entered into contracts with almost half of
all of the doctors in Rhode Island. Id. at 68.
54 Lower physician charges could generate an efficiency gain if doctors had previously
been charging monopoly rates. See M. WATERSON, EcONOMic THEORY OF THE INDUSTRY 83-
106 (1984)(describing benefits of eliminating successive monopolies through vertical affilia-
tion or integration). Lower doctor fees, however, also could reflect an anticompetitive exer-
cise of insurer monopsony power in the physician market.
55 Further, Ocean State paid doctors less than those physicians billed BC/BS not because
doctors lowered their rates to HMO subscribers, but rather because the doctors affiliated with
Ocean State agreed to share the HMO's risks. The physicians affiliated with Ocean State
allowed their reimbursement to vary with the financial health of the HMO. See supra note 36.
56 While the most favored nations provision was introduced at the same time BC/BS in-
troduced a product similar to an HMO, see supra note 35, BC/BS offered its new health insur-
ance plan only if a competing HMO was also being marketed, for example, by an employer to
its employees. Thus, neither BC/BS initiative appears directed primarily at reducing costs,
although some efficiencies could have arisen as ancillary consequences of a scheme aimed
primarily at creating market power.
162 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. XIV NOS. 2-3
State. '" Doctors understood that if they ceased participating in Ocean
State, the most favored nations clause could no longer be triggered, so
they were no longer threatened with reduced reimbursement from
BC/BS. Between the introduction of the BC/BS contract provision and
the time of trial, 350 of the 1200 Ocean State physicians resigned from
the HMO.58
It appears unlikely that the contract provisions at issue in Reazin
had the dominant motive and effect of lowering the costs of health care.
In partial contrast, BC/BS' contract provisions in Ocean State may have
generated some efficiency gain through lower physician fees. It is
doubtful, however, that this was the insurer's intent in Ocean State and
the court proffered no record evidence in support of this view.
Under the rule of reason, the social benefit generated by these
practices must be balanced against the social harm. The anticompeti-
tive effects are addressed in the next section of this article.
III. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS THAT RAISE RIVALS' COSTS
An affiliated group of hospitals, doctors and insurers may employ
vertical restraints to create market power by raising the costs borne by
affiliated groups of rival providers and insurers."9 Although neither in
Reazin nor in Ocean State was the argument framed in terms of raising
rivals' costs, this approach offers a logical way of explaining the an-
ticompetitive problems raised by the facts of the two cases.6
°
The methodology of this section merits a preliminary comment.
The analysis emphasizes identifying practices that generate market
power, 6' rather than identifying a legal pigeonhole under which the
practices should be addressed under the antitrust laws. This approach
identifies antitrust violations with harm to social welfare in the econo-
mists' sense of the term, a principle that is widely although not univer-
sally accepted today.62 Similarly, raising rivals' costs has been
57 Ocean State, 692 F. Supp. at 61.
58 However, some departures were not prompted by the most favored nations clause. Id.
at 61, 73.
59 Similarly, a practice that raises entry barriers could harm patients by permitting hori-
zontal collusion among physicians, hospitals, or health insurers, or by permitting the exercise
of market power by a dominant insurer. Practices that raise entry barriers can be thought of
as raising rivals' costs, where the relevant rivals are potential entrants rather than existing
competitors.
60 Cf. Ball Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc.. 784 F.2d 1235, 133940 (7th Cir.
1986)(rejecting theory that BC/BS intended its PPO to raise rivals' costs).
61 Practices that create market power by raising rivals' costs can be thought of as creating
an involuntary cartel. By raising costs to its rivals, the predator forces those rivals to reduce
output much as the rivals would be required to do were they to cooperate with the predator to
fix prices. Thus, a practice of raising rivals' costs and horizontal price fixing can lead to a
similar injury to competition.
6 2 See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 12, HORIZONTAL MERGERS: LAw
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proposed as a unifying framework for addressing exclusionary vertical
restraints under the antitrust laws based upon their economic effect,
regardless of whether the violation is characterized as tying, exclusive
dealing, a group boycott, monopolization, or under some other legal
rubric.
63
The complaint in the Reazin case can be understood in terms of
raising rivals' costs in two ways.6' The lawsuit began when BC/BS an-
nounced it would terminate the contract for insurer reimbursement of
patient charges at Wesley hospital. Had the termination gone into ef-
fect, according to the first theory it might have reduced patient willing-
ness to choose Wesley, made it impossible for Wesley to achieve
efficient production scale, and thereby increased Wesley's marginal
costs of serving patients. Moreover, the termination might have raised
Wesley's payment collection and processing costs, if BC/BS' collection
operations achieved scale economies no single hospital could match.
As a result, Wesley could have become a weaker competitor for the two
hospitals affiliated with BC/BS. The vertically affiliated combination of
Wesley, Health Care Plus, and associated doctors would have been
forced to increase patient charges, permitting BC/BS and its hospital
and physician affiliates to share monopoly profits.
Additionally, the contract termination may have raised rivals' costs
by convincing other existing and potential rivals to BC/BS in the health
insurance market that BC/BS would make increased competition ex-
pensive for them.65 Once they realized the costs of cutting prices, as
AND POLICY 5-26 (1986); cf Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop, supra note 15, at 245 n.25 (compar-
ing narrow and broad views of consumer welfare). As used in this article, the term economic
efficiency means the maximization of the aggregate (producer's plus consumers') surplus.
The technical difference between this criterion and the Pareto efficiency criterion is unimpor-
tant in this context. See generally R.JusT, D. HUETH & A. SCHMrrZ, APPLIED WELFARE ECONOM-
ICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982).
63 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 10, at 215-19. As a basis for antitrust intervention,
the raising rivals' costs logic is controversial because it leads to prohibiting some vertical
arrangements. Those who believe that harmful vertical practices are rare fear that courts will
apply this rationale inappropriately and that as a consequence many procompetitive vertical
arrangements will be inhibited. See, e.g., Brennan, Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs ", 33 AN-
TITRUST BULL. 95, 110 (1988)(arguing that raising rivals' costs may lend academic authority to
discredited Foreclosure and predations doctrines).
64 These two theories allocate the anticompetitive effect of BC/BS' actions to different
markets. The first theory supposes that BC/BS acts to help its affiliated hospitals obtain or
preserve market power in the hospital market. The second theory supposes that BC/BS ob-
tains or preserves market power for itself in the insurance market.
65 This theory is suggested by two bodies of economic literature. The first set of eco-
nomic articles shows how firms can profit by creating a reputation as a price cutter because
they can deter existing and future rivals from acting competitively. See Saloner, Predation,
Mergers, and Incomplete Information, 18 RANDJ. ECON. 165 (1987); Bums, Predatory Pricing and the
Acquisition Costs of Competitors, 94J. POL. ECON. 226 (1986); Milgrom & Roberts, Predation, Repu-
tation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. EcON. THEORY 280 (1982); Kreps & Wilson, Reputation and
Imperfect Information, 27J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982). The second body of economic literature
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would be expected to occur were they to generate cost savings through
affiliations with hospitals and doctors, existing rivals would keep prices
high by refraining from vertical integration. Further, prospective en-
trants would be deterred from offering new health insurance plans such
as HMOs in competition with BC/BS. Accordingly, BC/BS would re-
main free from intensified competition and would preserve its market
power.
If the Reazin jury found an antitrust violation on the first theory, it
must have resolved two factual questions against BC/BS. First, it must
have concluded that Wesley's costs would rise significantly. The jury
could have reached this view if it thought that a substantial number of
patients would have switched away from Wesley following the contract
termination - enough to cause the largest hospital in Wichita to lose
scale economies in providing many services.66 In support of this view,
the jury may have believed that many BC/BS subscribers would remain
loyal to the dominant insurer, rather than the hospital, if their costs of
continuing to deal with both BC/BS and Wesley rose.
Despite BC/BS' large market share, this conclusion was not com-
pelled. BC/BS announced it would continue to reimburse subscribers
choosing Wesley even though it cancelled its contract with that hospital
(although those subscribers would bear more administrative costs and
might not always receive full reimbursement). Moreover, patients who
selected Wesley, a tertiary care teaching hospital, because it offered
high quality care, might remain loyal to Wesley even if the termination
made them bear higher medical care expenses. Further, those Wesley
patients reimbursed through Medicare and Medicaid would be unlikely
to switch hospitals, assuming that their physicians remained affiliated
with Wesley. If few patients would have left Wesley following BC/BS'
contract termination, then Wesley's marginal costs would not have
risen significantly and the practice would not have harmed competition
through this raising rivals' costs mechanism.
67
Second, to find a violation on the first raising rivals' costs theory,
shows how firms can employ strategic instruments to gain or preserve market power by deter-
ring entry. See generally Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 335 (1979).
Although this is not, strictly speaking, a raising rivals' costs practice, the logic of this argu-
ment is sufficiently similar to one to justify treating it as an action raising rivals' costs.
66 In the alternative, the jury could have concluded that Wesley would bear higher admin-
istrative costs if it billed patients itself rather than contracting with BC/BS for that service. No
evidence in the opinions, however, bears on this possibility.
67 Alternatively, by reducing Wesley's market share to the point where the hospital's con-
tribution to profits would not cover its unavoidable fixed costs (including its administrative
overhead and the salvage value of its plant and equipment), the contract termination might
harm competition in the Wichita hospital market, even if Wesley's marginal costs do not in-
crease. Under such circumstances, Wesley would exit from the market, allowing the rival
hospitals affiliated with BC/BS to raise prices free of competition. As with the anticompetitive
story described in the text, this theory depends upon both a substantial number of patients
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the Reazin jury must have concluded that at least one of the compo-
nents of health care services (hospitals, doctors or health insurers) in
Wichita formed an antitrust market. Otherwise, BC/BS or its affiliates
could not reasonably expect to raise prices (or prevent a price decline)
by making the vertical grouping of providers and insurers affiliated with
Wesley a less effective competitor.68 Of three possibilities, a Wichita
hospital market is the most plausible.6 If the jury found a hospital
market, then it could have concluded that BC/BS acted anticompeti-
tively on behalf of its affiliated hospitals, the rivals to Wesley in a con-
centrated industry.7 °
To find a violation on the second theory, that BC/BS created a
reputation for aggressive competition, the Reazin jury must have re-
solved two other issues against BC/BS. First, it must have concluded
that the contract terminating Wesley would raise costs for Health Care
Plus by convincing the rival HMO that it would be expensive for that
HMO to lower insurance premiums for patients or to otherwise com-
pete vigorously. Similarly, it must have concluded that prospective en-
trants into the health insurance market should have reasonably feared
competition from BC/BS, and so would have been deterred from entry.,
Based upon BC/BS' own statements, the jury might have found that by
terminating Wesley, BC/BS in effect announced that rival insurers who
affiliate with providers in order to compete more intensely with BC/BS
could not expect to obtain affiliations with hospitals that service
BC/BS' subscribers. This prospect would have deterred new competi-
tion by making it more difficult for new insurers to induce BC/BS sub-
scribers to switch their coverage. The conclusion that competing
switching away from Wesley in response to its termination of its contract with BC/BS, and the
existence of entry barriers in the hospital market.
It also is possible that the reorganization of the Wichita health care industry raised Health
Care Plus' costs by precluding the HMO from contracting with the better quality providers of
medical services. This argument is founded on the facts of the instant case, however, because
Wesley is a desirable hospital and the HMO affiliated doctors are highly respected.
68 If the antitrust market is in provider services rather than health insurance, then the
tacitly colluding hospitals or doctors would compensate BC/BS in their reimbursement ar-
rangement for managing what effectively is a provider cartel. See infra note 74.
69 Baker, supra note 10 (metropolitan areas are plausible geographic markets for many
hospital services). The case for a physician market most likely depends upon the willingness
of new medical school graduates to locate at large distances from their medical school in
response to high doctor salaries. The case for a health insurer market likely relies on the costs
of patient switching among health care financing plans. Both of these alternatives are ex-
plored further below, in connection with an evaluation of a raising rivals' costs story on the
Ocean State facts. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
70 Under this theory, both Wesley and patients suffer injury directly resulting from the
practices that harm competition, and the competing HMO is injured insofar as BC/BS' con-
tract termination with Wesley causes the HMO to lose patients who have become unwilling to
commit to obtaining care at Wesley. Hence, the court properly found that Wesley and the
HMO have standing to challenge BC/BS' action. Reazin 1, 635 F. Supp. 1287, 1315-17, 1319
(D. Kan. 1986).
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insurers would be harmed was supported by evidence that two rival
hospitals in Wichita agreed to accept a 20% lower reimbursement from
BC/BS in exchange for BC/BS' decision to terminate Wesley.7
In addition, to find a violation on the second theory the jury must
have been convinced that BC/BS could profit by raising costs to rival
insurers. Thejury may reasonably have supposed that BC/BS was ben-
efited by avoiding the lower prices that would result from intensified
competition, if it believed that BC/BS was charging its subscribers
supracompetitive prices before it decided to terminate Wesley, or if it
believed that Wesley, Health Care Plus, and their affiliated doctors
would be able to achieve significant economies for an integration. The
jury may have concluded that BC/BS was capable of exercising market
power based upon BC/BS' large market share and a finding of entry
barriers. While the height of entry barriers into health insurance is
hotly debated in the abstract,72 the jury might reasonably have con-
cluded that BC/BS deterred entry through demonstrating to prospec-
tive rivals its willingness to terminate Wesley.
As with the Reazin case, the complaint in Ocean State might be inter-
preted as alleging that BC/BS acted anticompetitively by raising costs
to its existing HMO rival, Ocean State. 7  By introducing a most fa-
71 Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1381-82 (D. Kan.
1987). The inference of harm to competitors would have been stronger had BC/BS not an-
nounced that it would continue partial reimbursement of its subscribers for care at Wesley,
and had BC/BS convinced the rival Wichita hospitals to end their association with Health
Care Plus.
72 Some argue that entry into the business of providing health insurance is extremely
easy. One reason for this belief is that large employers can readily invite insurers from neigh-
boring states to offer coverage to their employees, bypassing the local carriers. See Ball Mem.
Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986)(insurer access to capital
is unlimited and patients are not the captive of existing insurers).
In contrast to this view, it may in fact be expensive for patients to change insurers, partic-
ularly when such switching would be associated with a change of medical providers (as most
likely would be true if the new insurer were an HMO). See Neipp & Zeckhauser, Persistence in
the Choice of Health Plans, 6 ADVANCES HEALTH EcON. & HEALTH RES. 47, 48-49 (1985). If
switching costs are large, then new insurers would be forced to incur substantial promotional
expenses (such as low introductory prices) as well as substantial delay (as potential switching
patients wait for their existing insurance contracts to expire, or as unaffiliated new subscribers
slowly move into the new insurer's market area). Assuming BC/BS is the dominant insurer,
successful entry into health insurance markets then would depend upon the entrant obtaining
affiliations with physicians and hospitals presently affiliated with BC/BS, some of whom may
have exclusive affiliations. Even if it is easy for a new entrant to obtain physician affiliations,
as is plausible, and hospital affiliations, as is possible (depending upon contractual relation-
ships with existing insurers), the entrant may not be able to convince many patients to switch
their coverage unless their preferred doctor and hospital combination is affiliated with the
new insurer.
73 The restriction could equally harm competition through the alternative mechanism of
raising entry barriers. If patients find it expensive to switch insurers, then a most favored
nations clause in BC/BS' contracts with physicians will raise entry barriers into the insurance
market and protect BC/BS' dominant position to the extent that the contract provision makes
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vored nations clause into its contracts with doctors, BC/BS may have
ensured that Ocean State could no longer convince its affiliated physi-
cians to share the financial risk of HMO operation. Indeed, the BC/BS
contract provision amplified the financial risk of HMO affiliation to doc-
tors. If Ocean State experienced an unsuccessful year, so that its pay-
ments to doctors were low, the physicians would also be forced to
accept lower fees from BC/BS. Hence, unless Ocean State rendered its
payment terms identical to those of BC/BS, most doctors would be un-
willing to affiliate with both BC/BS and the HMO.
BC/BS may have achieved market power (or preserved existing
high prices) by raising its competitor's costs of obtaining physician affil-
iations. Higher compensation costs may have generated BC/BS market
power in Ocean State through two mechanisms. The first mechanism
supposes that BC/BS was controlled by doctors who in effect employed
the insurer to coordinate a physician cartel. 74 If doctors colluded tac-
itly, then rival insurers (such as HMOs) would be unable to obtain doc-
tor affiliations (unless they encourage physicians to cheat on the
cooperative price for doctor services) .7  The most favored nations
clause may have deterred cheating on a physician cartel, thereby facili-
it less likely that a new HMO would be able to attract affiliations from doctors also affiliated
with BC/BS.
If, however, the most favored nations clause at issue in the Rhode Island litigation were
anticompetitive solely because it raised entry barriers to new insurance competition, the ex-
isting HMO rival would not be an appropriate plaintiff for vindicating competition. The ex-
isting rival would not have standing because it would lack antitrust injury. Health care.
consumers, or the state or federal government, would remain appropriate plaintiffs.
74 Among those who believe that market power is present in health care markets, it is not
settled whether BC/BS plans are mechanisms by which doctors and hospitals exercise market
power in selling health care to patients, or mechanisms by which BC/BS exercises monopsony
power in acquiring provider services. In either case the insurer management may appropriate
the resulting rents. Alternatively, subscribers may obtain the benefits of an insurer monop-
sony through lower fees. See generally Pauly, supra note 8; Miller, supra note 9.
If physicians were to cooperate to raise prices, they would surely require the help of a
cartel manager such as BC/BS because the large number of doctors in any area would make
the costs of coordination otherwise prohibitive. Cf Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 10, at
238 (cartel ring master). Moreover, several factors render it plausible that the physicians in
any metropolitan area form an antitrust market: the demand for many medical services is
likely to be inelastic, entry from established physicians moving from other metropolitan areas
is not plausible, and entry from new physicians choosing metropolitan areas in which to estab-
lish a practice is limited by the capacity of graduating medical school classes and by the degree
to which new doctors are responsive tusmall changes in starting salaries in choosing where to
settle.
Similarly, a hospital cartel also might be successful if formed in many regions of the coun-
try. In contrast with physicians, concentration may be sufficiently high in such markets as to
make it possible for hospitals to coordinate their cooperative arrangement without need for a
cartel manager such as BC/BS. See generally Baker, supra note 10.
75 A doctor would be willing to accept a lower reimbursement rate from a HMO, thereby
cheating- on the tacit physician cartel, if he or she expects that the lower cost of physician
services provided through the HMO would induce a large number of patients to switch from
BC/BS and its affiliated doctors.
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tating collusion among doctors, by making it uneconomic for physi-
cians to lower their fees to those patients participating in the HMO.7 6
Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate whether this plausible explana-
tion for the anticompetitive effect of a most favored nations clause ap-
plied to the facts of Ocean State because no evidence was presented from
which it would be possible to determine whether BC/BS in effect acted
to manage a physician cartel in Rhode Island."
Second, BC/BS may have achieved market power if the contract
provision caused so many doctors to terminate their affiliations with the
rival HMO that Ocean State fell below a minimum efficient scale of pro-
duction. Even assuming that the HMO's thirty percent decline in physi-
cian affiliations following BC/BS' introduction of a most favored
nations clause was entirely attributable to that provision, it is not clear
from the trial record whether the remaining 850 doctors were too few
for such a production scale.78
IV. CONCLUSION
By awarding judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the Ocean
State litigation, the district court judge determined that there was no
evidence from which the jury could properly find that plaintiff Ocean
State had met its burden of proof.79  If an antitrust violation depends
76 Thus, a most favored nations clause facilitates collusion among horizontal rivals by
allowing each rival to commit to bearing large costs of cheating on a cooperative arrange-
ment. See generally Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-ordination, in NEw DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 265-90 U. Stiglitz & G. Mathewson eds.,
1986).
An HMO might attempt to avoid the disincentive for doctors to affiliate with it created by
the BC/BS' most favored nations clause by restructuring its physician compensation arrange-
ment, described supra at note 36, to allow its doctors to reduce their fees without triggering
the clause in bad years. For example, the HMO might characterize the withheld physician
reimbursements as a capital contribution. BC/BS, however, presumably could respond by
rewriting its contracts to preserve the disincentive for its affiliated doctors to participate in the
HMO.
77 For example, if the record contained evidence that BC/BS' physician reimbursement
rates were higher in Rhode Island than in states where BC/BS does not have as large a market
share (after controlling for regional variation in the costs of providing medical insurance and
physician services), the jury might reasonably have inferred that Rhode Island doctors were
exercising market power.
78 In support of this theory, Ocean State alleged that physician shortages in certain vital
medical specialities, such as cardiac surgery, resulted from BC/BS' introduction of the chal-
lenged contract provision. Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of R.I., 692 F. Supp. 52, 61 (D. R.I. 1988). If Ocean State could remedy the crucial
shortages at little additional expense, however, as by offering slightly higher reimbursement
rates to cardiac surgeons, its costs would not have increased substantially.
This theory also requires that entry barriers preserve BC/BS from new competition in the
health care market. Although this proposition is controversial in the abstract, see supra note
72, the most favored nations clause may have created an entry barrier for new insurers in the
instant case by making it difficult for them to obtain physician affiliations.
79 Ocean State, 692 F. Supp. at 64-65.
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upon a demonstration that the challenged practice likely confers mar-
ket power on an excluding firm by raising rivals' costs, it is uncertain
whether this standard was met. The jury could reasonably have found
that the challenged contract provision had no procompetitive purpose,
but evidence on the presence or absence of beneficial effects was lack-
ing."0 Moreover, it is difficult to say whether a jury could reasonably
have found that the most favored nations clause could permit BC/BS to
achieve or preserve market power by increasing costs to the rival HMO.
The main problem is the lack of evidence from which to determine
whether BC/BS was effectively acting as a cartel manager for Rhode
Island doctors, or whether the reductions in Ocean State's size in-
creased its costs. 8'
When faced with a similar decision, the district court in Reazin ap-
pears to have properly denied motions for new trial and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.8" The evidence in the Reazin record seems
sufficient to permit the inferences that BC/BS had an anticompetitive
motive in terminating Wesley,8" and that the termination had the an-
ticompetitive effect of creating market power either for BC/BS 4 or,
more likely, for its affiliated hospitals.8"
As the reorganization of the health care industry continues, vertical
restraints among hospitals, doctors, and insurers such as those litigated
in Reazin and Ocean State will be created with increasing frequency.
.Although such vertical restraints are often socially beneficial, this Arti-
cle has shown that they can confer market power by raising rivals' costs
and can, in consequence, violate the antitrust laws, regardless of the
doctrinal category in which they are framed. Moreover, the raising ri-
vals' costs framework offers a valuable conceptual tool for assessing the
possible harm to competition.
80 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
S1 See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
2See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1410 (D. Kan.
1987)(standard of review).
8 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
